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Research Paper

An Appraisal of the Naxalite Insurgency in India: Causes, Impacts and Response of the State

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Abstract

The Naxalite movement has become a strong revolutionary movement that challenges the socio-economic suppression and inequality in the State. The sense of deprivation, increased grievances, growing marginalization and exploitation by the governments on the bases of socio-cultural, economic and political fault lines are intensifying the insurgency in India and enhancing security vulnerabilities of the state. Less attention of the state to address the increasing sense of distrust is further providing fuel to fire. The exploitation and deprivation forced these marginalized people to take up arms to reinstate their basic rights. There are wide spread social, economic and political rights suppression and violations by the Indian government in those areas. The qualitative analysis of data and sources reveal that the people of the northeast India have not seen an improvement in the strategy of the Indian government. The situation of the people thus left the insurgency alive but with a dwindling influence and reduced violence. However, the current state of affairs and news reports reveal that the Naxalite movement is alive though it may have reduced its operational limits. The presence of such a movement is also indication of the fact that the grievances of the population are still there. The decrease in violence does not mean the problem is gone neither does it mean that the counter insurgency strategy was successful, rather it means that the conflict may arise again at any time whether the state is prepared for it or not.





Introduction:

The state of India has been experiencing significant economic development for the past two decades which may seem remarkable for some but at home India is facing an ongoing internal security crisis that has existed for almost 50 years now. The insurgencies in the north east of India have been a major challenge for successive governments. In this situation, though, India portrays itself as a regional economic hegemon but is actually troubled deeply when it comes to providing for its own people and for the condition of its internal security.

India is one of those states that has gone through a series of insurgences and secessionist movements. The discontent of the people with the Indian state has only grown, thereby, implying the sad reality that a state aiming for regional economic hegemony does not invest on its own people. Left wing extremism has risen in India over time, highlighting the fact that successive polices of the state have been weak or insignificant in changing the lives of the people who continue to face deprivation and marginalizing at the hands of those who have been given a better status in society mainly due to the caste system.

Insurgencies are motivated by the politico- military agenda, they use social, political and economic means with a goal of achieving a broader political campaign. The use of violence is prevalent in an insurgency with direct and armed asymmetric mode of warfare for pursuing political aims (Unal, 2016). Insurgencies span about 10 years reaching the peak, then the end that lingers for some time and dies away. The average




length of insurgencies is 10 years as long as they manage to hold out the government. Guillen (1973), states that the insurgency must have the peoples support and great majority must side with the insurgents to win.

Galula (1964) and Dinesh (2000) define and state that insurgency is a protracted conflict, the disparity in the cost and effort is the reason behind this. It is because of this reason that a long lingering dispute then uses various tactics like guerilla warfare, terrorism and belligerency to damage the writ of the state. Guillen (1973) describes urban insurgencies plan of action by which the insurgents live separately and fight together in order to challenge the security of the state particularly the functioning of the police. Urban insurgents disguise themselves as normal people living in the city so that they cannot be captured or detained.

A diverse definition of an insurgency is seen emphasizing that insurgents uses subversion and violence, however, not all insurgencies make use of violence. Public support for an insurgency requires that the organization exists with some level of effectiveness. The grievances and identity along with many other factors contribute to the insurgency to a significant level. There is strong motivation behind an insurgency, something that is contributing to a worthy cause that brings honor (Davis & O'Mahony, 2013). The support of the population is one of the key ingredients of an insurgency as can be seen in Figure 1. The tree model clearly indicates that the grievances of the population will compel them to take steps against the writ of the government.

Figure 1: Tree model relieving relative strength of an insurgency



Source: Davis, P., & O'Mahony, A. (2013). A prototype for More - general Social Science Modeling . In P. Davis, & A. O Mahony, A computational Model of Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism (pp. 7-28). RAND Corporation.

In the area that became known as the Red Corridor of India, the Maoist inspired insurgencies took string hold and became a major issue in seven eastern states of India.

The seven states which then made up the revolts were:

1. Odisha
2. Jharkhand



3. Maharashtra
4. Telangana
5. Chhattisgarh
6. Bihar
7. Andhra Pradesh

The Nagaland Insurgency:

This insurgency of the Naga spans the Indian States of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. They are also present in upper Sagaing region in Myanmar. It is considered as the mother of insurgencies in the region, that is due mainly because of their military and political strength. The peace process there started as the government ended outright hostilities in 1997. The peace process is though thwarted by the factionalism and lingering disputes regarding the ethnic Naga's. The region continues to face low-level of violence (Waterman, 2019). The Northeast is one of these areas of post – colonial India that faced the brunt of this conflict. The Naga National Council, had declared independence a day before India. The post-independence India laid claims of the Naga hills as they became a large part of Assam. They wanted self-rule so they entered into negotiations with the Indian government but soon it was clear that their demands will not be met. Hence the emergence of the Naga Army and the guerilla warfare began. The Naga leaders later on also formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) they carried out armed attacks until the ceasefire in 1997 as the peace process began (Bhaumik, 2007; Dinesh, 2000).



Mizoram Insurgency:

In Assam's Mizoram hills in the 1960's the armed insurrection took place in the area that is now known as the Indian State of Mizoram. The cause of this is



traced back to the bamboo flowering and the rat explosion in the population of Assam's Mizo Hills. The organization Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) was formed to help the victims of the rat Famine as rats had destroyed the crops and this resulted into mass Starvation. The leader of the movement was Lalgenga who took command of the MNFF which then became known as the Mizo National Front. (MNF). They took control of nine towns in 1966 under Operation Jericho. The Indian army struggled to take back control of the captured areas. The Mizoram hills were later carved out of Assam area and given under federal control, to form the federally administered province of Mizoram that was made a state in 1987 as result of the signed agreement between the rebels and the government in 1986. Mizoram remain now a peaceful region (Bhaumik, 2007).

Assam Insurgency:

The insurgency in Assam is a long standing issue, which has not been addressed by the Indian Government. The most significant and old groups in the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was founded in the year 1979. The ULFA is not completely gone but has become dormant. The neighboring movements and the intra Assam movements have continued to threaten peace in this region.



Tripura Insurgency:

The Tripura front was formed in 1990's, All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the National Liberation Front (NLFT) conducted armed activities against the Bengali settlers (Sajjad & Rehman, 2019). Both these groups split now and are considered weaker than before. The people joined this organization because they believed that they were being marginalized. (Bhaumik, 2007)

Manipur Insurgency:

The Manipur insurgency conducted by the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in 1964. It remains the strongest separatist group in Manipur. The leader of the Movement Hijam Irabot Singh, opposed Manipur's merger with India and left the Indian communist movement, he had a separatist ideology. (Bhaumik, 2007)

Table 1: Insurgent movements of Northeast India divided into five categories

Category	Insurgent Movements	Organizations
Insurgencies based on deep colonial roots	The Naga Insurgency	Naga National Council (NNC)
Insurgencies that demand autonomy under the rhetoric of separatist goals	Tribal insurgency in Tripura or the Bodo Insurgency or the Dimsa and the Karbi insurgencies in Assam	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) Bodoland Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF)



Insurgencies with sharp initial separatist outcomes and the ones that were ultimately on the Indian system through negotiations and concessions	The example of such an insurgency is the Mizo insurgency	Mizo National Front (MNF)
The insurgencies that seek to change the Indian system of governance	Manipur PLA before 1990 Communist insurgency of Tripura.	Tirpura Tiger Force (ATTF) Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
Insurgencies under taken by a powerful group that function as satellites	Dragon Force or the United Peoples Volunteers of Arunachal (UPVA) they are used by Naga Rebels and Assamese groups to function outside of their own domain.	United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) Asam Jatiyabadi Yuba Chatra Parishad (AJYCP)



Source: *Davis, P., & O'Mahony, A. (2013). A prototype for More - general Social Science Modeling . In P. Davis, & A. O Mahony, A computational Model of Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism (pp. 7-28). RAND Corporation*

The Case of Naxalite Movement in India:

This movement includes the Nepalese and Naxalite communists who are followers of the Maoist Ideology the central idea of the philosophy Foquismo. Leaders of the movement such as Kanu Sanyal and Charu Mazumdar also



see feudalism a major and fundamental cause of their grievances. Insurgent movements such as the India- Naxalite insurgency may have consisted of 30 active groups of which 10 were at least properly functional (Sajjad & Rehman, 2019).

The armed conflict that went on between the Indian government and the Maoist insurgency is known as Naxalite movement. This growing conflict is widening with the passage of time since 2000s' between the state and the insurgents. The armed wing of the Maoist-Naxalite is People Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) that is estimated having 7000 to 10000 guerrilla fighters possessing small arms. Maoist control most of the territory of Bihar, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh states claim to have the strong support of the local population especially the indigenous Adivasi's (Bhaumik, 2007).

According to Jonathan Kennedy in his doctoral thesis (2013), "Political economy of conflict between indigenous communities and dominant societies: Adivasi's, Maoist



insurgents and the state in the central Indian tribal belt” , insurgency in India is for attaining of state power. The scholar defines the reasons of why commoners join the insurgency by explaining the three waves of Insurgency in India. The scholar focuses on the district level by analyzing the indigenous community’s role along with the tribal lords. The scholars mainly focused on the political economy of conflict how they play the role in the conflict intensity or resolution. Many things have been discussed about the politico-economic dimensions of the conflict. Another scholar Lenart Bendfeldt (2010), in his work ‘Naxalism: The Maoist Challenge to Indian State’, argues that this Naxalite movement has a long history of fifty three years behind. The author explains that ground of this movement is Maoist ideology and getting empowered from the support of aggrieved, deprived and underprivileged people of the local rural areas. Author argues that Maoist movement is becoming a serious threat because many areas of the country under the Naxalite influence and the number of their militia is increasing.

These are the major issues that the Naxalite movement focused on:

- Reallocation of lands and resources
- Provision of minimum wages for farmers
- Running a parallel government who can impose penalties and taxes
- To have kangaroo courts
- To be able to enforce a naxal social code of conduct (Garge, 2019).

Modus Operandi of Maoist Insurgents:

The armed wing of the Maoist-Naxalite is People Liberation Guerrilla army (PLGA) that estimated having 7000 to 10000 guerrilla fighters possessing small arms. Maoist control most of the territory of Bihar, Jharkand and



Andhera Pardesh states claim to have the strong support of the local population especially the indigenous Adivasi's.

The armed struggle for their restoration of rights Maoist are seen as a driving force in the form of Communistic ideology that is prevailing as it supports their cause. These groups are reported to have violating the human rights in the region and inflicting atrocities on the lower class people having support of the state government. Naxalite almost operate in seven districts of India in the states of Orissa, Jharkand, Andhra Pardesh, Madhya Pardesh, Maharashtra and West Bangal. Chattisgarh is a central point where insurgency is on peak.

Phases of Insurgency:

Naxalite philosophy runs through three main phases.

- a) The first phase is considered as operation stage when overt activities are pursued to gain the maximum influence. On this stage level of violence is limited but need for organization is more. At operational stage state is stronger than the



insurgent Naxalites. At this stage contacts are built by the state at the grass root level.

- b) The second phase of this insurgency is guerrilla zone where strict actions are taken by the insurgents. This is that stage where power of the state and the insurgents is equal.
- c) The third stage is people mobile war where people try to control the state power. Extra ordinary steps are taken to control the state power and exercise the helm of the affairs. This is the stage where insurgents kill the political icons to create the vacuum where they could get the reins of powers in their hands.

People and Leadership of Insurgents:

Leadership and chain of command is stronger in the Naxalite insurgency. This insurgency is unique in the sense because it aims for socio-economic progress of the deprived class. This insurgency is landlord centered against suppression, violation and political marginalization of the Adivasi's or the lowest class. This insurgency is widespread because it is linked with many areas in India with effective command in the regional perspective. Moreover, red corridor is in strong grip of the insurgents who are the followers of communistic ideology and this corridor is the center of most of India. Leadership is at the helm of the affairs leading the communistic parties in India. The insurgency is growing with the increasing grievances and use of force of the state machinery to control the opposition. As far as the Naxalite movement is concerned, the communist party which have roots in the Naxalbari uprising of 1967 from where the term

Naxalism actually took birth and uprising was initiated by the Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Ram Prabahv Singh and Jangal Santhal in the form of armed struggle to redistribute the lands. So in 1969, all India communist groups combined under the Indian Communist party. It is said that 1970s, the movement fragmented into many faction and till 1980, these factions reached to thousands of numbers. In 1980, communist party of India commonly founded by the people's war group founded by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah. (Singh, 2012)

Ideology of the Naxalite Insurgents:

The philosophy of the insurgents is that they believe in the use of arms and guns. They believe that in parliamentary democracy most of the times landlords and people of power obtain the maximum support of the



government by using their influence and power. In this war rights of the commoners are usurped and suppressed because they are left with no say in the mainstream affairs of state. This led them to think for reinstatement of their rights and when they are left with no choice then they use the power and arm struggle the state apparatus.

Conditions for an Insurgency in India:

- Environment for operations is ripe because insurgents have scattered in many areas of the India.



- They have strong support of the local people for the operationalization of their strategies.
- Having strong indigenous support Maoist guerrillas are seen to be quite effective in conducting insurgent activities.
- Moreover, geographical terrain is in favor of the insurgents they take refuge in jungles and other different areas of guerrilla zone that is quite useful for the purpose of hit and hide as well as surprise attacks.
- Furthermore, states policies are also making them reactionaries and providing environment to proceed where it becomes impossible to control.

External Support for Maoists

There is less observable support for the Maoists insurgents as they are scattered in almost the whole of India. They have strong political and ideological backing within the country in many states. It is claimed by the Indian government that Maoist insurgents are politically supported by the communist party and by the Nepal Maoists. However, it is usually assumed that no insurgency can survive without the economic, political and weaponry external supports. Maoist insurgency is no different from this factor of fact. It is also said that there is a strong Russian ideological support behind the Naxalite insurgency. The only reason behind this is that it's basically a class struggle between top and bottom sections of society. There is definitely economic, political and security support for the Maoist insurgents within and from outside against the suppressive and discriminate policies of the state. Additionally, special zone committees and state committees like



many communist parties have been made in Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. Same is the case with the district, local and village committees have been formulated (Singh, 2012).

Many mass organizations, cooperations and other committees are there have armed personnel. A military militia of guerrilla insurgents is there supported by the local militias for certain kind of actions. There are many weapons with these insurgents of different categories including AK 47, grenades and many others.

Indian Government Policies in the Insurgent Regions

Policies of Indian state have been discriminatory because these lower class people were left underdeveloped and unattended for decades who ultimately took arms for the establishment of their rights. The policy of the Indian government has been exploitative, unequal, politically sidelining and indiscriminate as compared to the ruling elite and landlords. The matter of the fact is this that state never owned these lower class Adivasi's people this undue preference and repression of the commoners led to the problematic situation and discontentment that invited uprisings and agitations against the state. Furthermore, the biggest thing that created opposing posture of the states is supporting the Salwa Jadum against the insurgents in combined. The use of force policy by the government side in the favor of Salwa Jadum is breeding more violence in the region. The less socio-economic progress crushing policies by using forces are aggravating the conflict rather controlling or resolving the situation within the country. These policies of the government have broadened the picture of the intensity of uprisings and insurgency in red corridor of India.



Theoretical framework of Counter Insurgency (COIN):

Counter insurgency is a strategy that is opted or followed to control or crush the insurgency. Mostly, counter insurgency is followed by the governments against the popular uprisings or insurgencies encountered. These counter insurgencies are followed in terms of socio-economic and political realms or through military means. Effective COINs are those in which firstly social and economic reforms are introduced for the pacification of intensifying situation. Later on political solution is sought out for peaceful resolution. However, if all options fail than as a last resort use of force is considered. Most of the countries where such insurgencies are going on, governments take punitive measures without realizing their own mistakes and flawed policy making in their respective case (Garge, 2019 ; Shapiro, Eynde, Ingram, & Aqawu, 2017).

Some psychological factors also get involved in this counter insurgency process in an efficient and effective way. Uprisings and insurgencies do not erupt in vacuum rather are strongly supported by the localities of that state or country. When there is a question of deprivation, exploitation and political marginalization it is usually inflicted upon the weaker, common, poor and rural communities. So the moral and economic support is provided by the indigenous localities having ideological affinities. The case of Maoist insurgency is no different from this reality. The wise counter insurgency strategy in this case would be the breaking of command of chain and discredit the local support for the insurgents. This will be only possible with the winning of hearts and minds of the local people that would be only possible with the establishment of trust building.



There are a number of Factors that are required to make an effective COIN strategy that include the following:

a. Legitimacy of the Government:

Legitimacy is a very significant factor in the counter insurgency strategy. This is the legitimacy of actions, policies and actions taken by the government side that will determine the legality government moves taken towards this goal. Legitimacy of action is important because the role of the state whether positive or negative depend on the legitimacy that they establish. Insurgency is essential against the writ of the state, and counter insurgency is essentially an implementation of that. In the case of Naxalite insurgency, the negative thing is that government of India is taking punitive actions against these people instead of referring to the actual cause of the matter, that is further deteriorating the situation. Use of force is not the wise policy but the last strategy to cover and counter the growing violence and resolve the conflict in a pragmatic way. Naxalite insurgency is unique in its nature because behind this there is a strong ideology and clash between the peasants and landlords.

b. Unity of Effort:

Unity of effort will be built by having the support of local people for the success of any counter insurgency strategy. In the case Naxalite, government has to detach the support of the insurgents from locals and make the environment unfavorable for the insurgents by winning hearts and minds of local people. By taking all the stakeholders on board unity of effort for the decreasing violence and conflict resolution is needed



for an effective counter insurgency rather than just supporting Salwa Jadum unconditionally. These strategies are lacking in the Indian government policy that is still unable to end the Maoist insurgency. This biased behavior and unequal treatment is enhancing the suspicion of the locals and Adivasi's who then take up arms against the government.

c. Understanding the Environment for COIN

Effective counter insurgency strategy is to accurately read the situation and environment of the conflict. Accurate calculation of the situation will lead to the accurate counter insurgency strategy. Furthermore, many campaigns can be initiated for the purpose of convincing the locals and winning their support. The best method for the Indian policy should be to understand the environment accurately.

d. Economic Strategy and its Impacts:

Economic strategies in true letter and spirit and their pragmatic implementation is necessary tool for the effective counter insurgency strategy in an insurgency.

In the case of the Naxalite their demand of redistribution of lands has been negated. This has prevented the viable counter insurgency strategy effectively because economic grievances of the Maoists are greater. This was the dimension for which purpose this clash had started based on the communistic ideology against the ruling landlord class. There is a great tussle that emerged between these two classes having economic basis. Both of these social classes have distinct ideologies while government



support the militia of lords that was built to counter the insurgents. However, on the hand side, Maoists insurgents are facing wrath of lords' militia and government as well.

Economic deprivation of the Maoists and grievances are further strengthened due to double standards of government. However, government of India has introduced the packages for those will surrender in front of the law enforcement agencies and the government. Moreover, developmental policies are made and followed by the government but that are discriminatory and against the welfare of the lower classes. This class struggle is based on the economic perspective which is confrontation of two ideologies. Lower class has taken the arms for reinstatement of their rights and acquisition of their property rights. They also claim to be treated on equal footing at least on human grounds.

e. Military Strategy of India to Counter:

Major paramilitary right-wing groups are Salwa Judum and Ranvir Sena. This is the place where Salwa Judum is operating that is a move by the tribal lords to counter the insurgency same is the case with Ranvir Sina. Both of these groups are launched by the landlords to counter the insurgency in the region. The insurgency is ongoing because of forceful policies of the government and indiscriminate behavior with the lower classes. Though, influence of the Maoists has been decreased in many districts due to punitive measures but it is unable to control the movement. The sole reason behind is the use of force and unequal treatment of the states where distrust takes birth and lead to the restlessness, uprising and conflict by the local people who have a strong ideology

behind. Another significant reason behind why this insurgency could not control is strong communistic ideology which is not a driving force to continue the fight (Shapiro, Eynde, Ingram, & Aqawu, 2017).

The Role of a Paramilitary Group: Salwa Jadum

Salwa Jadum which was established in 2005 for counter insurgency strategy formulated by the land lords and sponsored by the state government brought major shifts and due to which



many people displaced and severe violence erupted in the region. So these fears and threat perception led the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to say, 'the single biggest internal security challenge faced by the security' (The Hindu, 2010 ; Roy, 2017). Such remarks repeatedly conveyed many times on many occasions by different politicians. Insurgents are active in more than two hundred districts in India and insurgents claimed the major territory of the state. Military strategy is neither viable nor pragmatic. Salwa Judum is supported and coordinated by the state machinery and law enforcement agencies. The continuous violence provoked by the Maoist led the Indian government to devise a new strategy to strike hard by building maximum pressure. This campaign brought productive effects by arresting plenty of criminals and controlling them and compelling them to surrender. Operation Green Hunt (2009- present) also launched to crush the insurgencies once for all by sending thousands of troops for the purpose (Magioncalda, 2010).



Government used many actions with the collaboration of Salwa Judum many times when level of violence increased and seemed to be getting out of control of the state apparatus. Forces are used with collaboration of Salwa Jadum (militia of lords) to acquire the desired goals.

Salwa Judum is rumored to be funded by the state government and many corporations are interested in gaining more resources. Salwa Judum is untrained and creates violence increasingly having weapons in their possession. These Salwa Judum members enter into the villages of Naxalite control and inflict violence by murdering, burning the houses and raping. Indian government has taken some steps but these are proving ineffective and inefficient and creating such an environment where violence is increasing multifold in the region. To counter the insurgency and guerrilla activities jungle school has been built from where civilians or retired armed forces people fight guerrilla like guerrilla but it proved less effective because after graduating here people go for big cities to serve where pay is much attractive compare to other (Rawat, 2019).

Indian government started Operation Green Hunt to crush the Naxalite in a single blow by sending 70,000 military troops but this proved ineffective because Naxalite have organizations in more than one region. This conflict of Naxalite has roots from the past history when there was a caste system prevailing in Indian set up. There were Brahman on top of the list while Untouchables at the lowest ebb of society and political lot. Conflict of Naxalites is complex in its nature because there have been continuous uprisings of peasants' in socio-political circles. This movement of Naxalites have link with these



peasants' and rural rebellions. Naxalite which are basically communist made their own 'sarkar' which called Janatan Sarker which control most of the affairs of the autonomous region. This Sarkar of the Naxalites was landowner centered (Singh, 2012).

To crush these insurgent movements the landowners established Salwa Judum to crush the uprising with the help of state forces. However, these forces inflicted atrocities on the areas of Naxalites and committed murders, rapes, looting and plundering and many others. However, many assume that these forces are state sponsored and widening the gap between these Naxalite forces and the Indian government. Indian government took many steps to resolve the conflict but use of force proved lethal for the regional peace. It increased the distrust and suspicion about the role of the government that was unduly supporting the landowners and Salwa Judum. The issue of insurgency is that socio-economic inequality and repressive policies of the government along with off shots of colonial rule are making this movement severe. As all of this suppression and repression is these Adivasi people centered who are already aggrieved and deprived in the Indian society (Singh, 2012). The severity of the insurgency is not horizontal rather it is inconsistent. It is greater in few areas while in other areas it is not so. The role of civil service has been controversial in this regard because of inefficiency and corruption over here. Having certain severe reasons in terms of socio-economic, political marginalization, deprivation and exploitations are coupled with the unequal treatment of the government is further aggravating the situation and leading it to the new severe intensities and uprisings against the harmful polices of state against these people.



This insurgency has transformed into the ideological movement that is based on communistic ideology as it was started for the rights of the people. Naxalite people have taken arms in their hands to challenge and shift the prevailing status quo in their favor. This severe resistance against the policies of landowners and state policies is deteriorating the situation. This Naxalite Insurgency is growing till today and moving with pace even today because use of force has been used against these people and they are always treated as third rate human being. This situation is not only complex but multiplying the problems and peace is absent in the region.

Naxalite wanted an autonomous region for the reinstatement of their rights where their rights could be equal to the other citizens of India. So that political marginalization ends and they enter into the mainstream politics to have their say. This is the situation at present day. However, use of force is not a solution for the both sides rather political and diplomatic option for the resolution of the conflict is best one. The year of 2006 proved to be turning point when Maoist signed peace accord with the restoration of political power. It brought serious impacts on the insurgency in red corridor. In 2009, state increased its counterinsurgency activities in central India and sent almost 10,000 paramilitary troops to counter the uprising and insurgency and started operation 'Green Hunt'. This encounter led the insurgents uprising and almost 76 police and paramilitary troops killed by the insurgents. In 2014, Modi government is thinking to take punitive action the Naxalite movement and linking it with terrorism.



Naxalite Insurgency in India: A Contemporary View

The Naxalite insurgency gained power in 2004 to 2010 in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkand. This triggered a major Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) response, also with the efforts of the state forces who were also helped by the pro-government militia. The peak of this conflict was reached in 2010 but since then violence ratio has dropped and remained consistent over the years as shown in Figure 2 (Staniland,2020).




Figure 2 : Conflict related Fatalities in India (The Ministry of Home Affairs Data)

Source : Staniland, P. (2020, September 13). *Political Violence in South Asia : The Triumph of the State ?* . Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace :

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/03/political-violence-in-south-asia-triumph-of-state-pub-82641>



There have been several factors associated in reducing this violence by the insurgents against India.

a) Increased International Security:

Increased internal security in the past two decades have led to a better security provision Increased policing in the north east central reserve police force(CRPF) and border security force (BSF) from 1988 – 2018 and the Assam Rifles (AR) that functions in the north east has also been expanded in recent years to provide additional security. The MHA expenditures rose by 15 annually since 2011(Staniland, 2020 ; Nilesh, 2012). It is reported that from November 2019 and April 2020 the Naxalite launch their tactical counter offensive and conduct maximum strikes and that from June to September they recruit people (Das, 2019).

b) Demobilization and amnesties in the Northeast:

The second factor in reducing insurgent violence is the effective role of demobilization and amnesty deals to reintegrate the insurgents, the presence of security forces has led to long running ceasefires and negotiations (Staniland,2020). This was a significant step in providing incentives so that terrorism in the region could be decreased.




Figure 3 : Conflict related fatalities in India (Based on the Ministry of Home Affairs data)

Source: Staniland, P. (2020, September 13). *Political Violence in South Asia : The Triumph of the State ?* . Retrieved from *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* :

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The SAMADHAN (Table 2) is one of the policy initiatives take by the Indian Government that is divided into two important categories security and Development. This comprehensive policy plan was implemented in May 8th 2017 by the Union Home Minister. The Ministry of Home was responsible for the implementation of this plan of action. Cutting edge technology was introduced such as trackers for weapons, biometrics for smart guns and Unique identification cards for the gelatin sticks and explosives for the counter insurgency forces for the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).



Table 2 : SAMADHAN full form explained

S	Smart Leadership
A	Aggressive Strategy
M	Motivation and Training
A	Actionable Intelligence
D	Dashboard Based KPI's* and KRAs**
H	Harnessing Technology
A	An Action Plan for Each Theatre
N	No Access to Financing

*KPIs - Key Performance Indicators

** KRAs - Key Result Areas

Source : Garge, R. (2019). Security and Development : An Appraisal of the Red Corridor. Vivekananda International Foundation. Retrieved January 2, 2021, from

<https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/security-and-development-an-appraisal-of-the-red-corridor.pdf>

Conclusion

The Naxalite insurgency is the example of a classical insurgency. The resilience of the people who have kept the insurgency alive is obvious after almost half a century of conflict.

The counter insurgency experts describe it as a unique case. The government of India is at



heart the cause of this conflict as they have been unable to address the problem all these years. The suppressive, divisive and marginalizing policies of the Indian government against these communities for decades have only exacerbate the grievances for the people against the government. These areas were ignored during the colonial period and even after independence of India was achieved. That is primarily due to India caste system as the Dalit and the other such communities continue to revolt. The neglect was observed because of the insignificant economic contribution of this area for India, therefore the pace of development to these districts have been very slow. Hence people who support the Maoists feel themselves to be economically, politically and socially marginalized and treated unjustly. Such a treatment of the Adhivasi's and Dalits have led to a widespread displacement, exploitation, land alienation and worst living conditions. Their sense of deprivation, discontent and depression due to the government's policies has only increased.

Although, it is evident that Maoists - Naxalite cannot win from one of the largest armies of the world through violent and forceful means. The best solution of the Maoists is political solution for both the parties for permanent solution of the matter. It is also significant to highlight that neither Maoists nor New Delhi can win through merely violent means. This insurgency by the Naxalites is a big question mark on the Indian territorial integrity, economic development and political harmony in the eyes of the international community. Due to this major issues have arisen that include human rights violations, India's response to the insurgency and the socio-economic deprivation of a such a large community of people. It is important to highlight that the insurgency only became a major challenge for



the state of India because a large section of the population did not have access to basic necessities with a large percentage of socio- economic disparity. It was therefore necessary for India to formulate futuristic and immediate policies to address the problems of these people. It is for this reason that India enacted the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005 and others such however the results have been insignificant of these efforts. The Modi Government has put a tight leash on the Naxalite movement but that does not solve the problems of the people and only puts them on hold through state pressure and violence. It is evident that such measure will only mount the internal pressure that will erupt into a massive unrest

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